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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20010585-CA

vs.
RANDY PETER KRUKOWSKI,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
In his brief, defendant argues that the trial court correctly found that police were
prompted to secure the search warrant by what they observed during their initial, unlawful
entry in the storage shed. Aple. Brf. at 8-16. He also contends that suppression was required
under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978), because the search warrant
affidavit did not advise the magistrate of the initial entry and consequent discovery of the
methamphetamine lab. Aple. Brf. at 16-24.1 As fully explained in the State's opening brief,
defendant is mistaken. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-22.
1

Defendant also contends that Officer McNaughton violated the Franks doctrine
"by implying that the [drug detection] dog had alerted to the area immediately south of
unit 16, without acknowledging that the dog in fact alerted on unit 15." Aple. Brf. at 2224. This claim has no merit. Immediately after indicating in his affidavit that the dog "hit
on the area immediately South of unit #16," Officer McNaughton stated that the dog
"indicated the presence of narcotics from under the doorway of unit #15" R. 163
(emphasis added). Officer McNaughton could not have been more forthright with the
magistrate.
1

Defendant also advances several challenges to the validity of the search warrant itself.
For the reasons explained below, those challenges fail.
A. The Search Warrant Was Supported By Probable Cause.
In the third point of his brief, defendant contends that the search warrant affidavit did
not establish probable cause that evidence of a methamphetamine lab would be found in the
storage shed. Aple. Brf. at 24-29. Because warrants are favored under the Fourth
Amendment, a magistrate's probable cause determination is afforded great deference. State
v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^ 10, 40 P.3d 1136. "Consequently, a magistrate's decision
to grant a search warrant should only be reversed if it was arbitrarily exercised." See United
States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471,478 (6th Cir. 2001). Defendant has not made that showing.
Defendant argues that the magistrate could not rely on the confidential informants
because police did not conduct any controlled buys, perform surveillance of the storage shed,
or determine whether a Randy Kawalski rented shed 16, had a prior history of drug-related
offenses, or even existed, Aple. Brf. at 27. While these steps may very well have aided the
magistrate in assessing reliability, they were not necessary. "Probable cause for a search
warrant is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is located at the
place indicated by the [officer's] affidavit" United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012,1014 (10th
Cir. 1982) (quoted with approval in State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)). In other words, <4[t]here is no requirement that the belief be
shown to be necessarily correct or more likely true than false." United States v. Feliz, 182
F.3d 82,87 (1st Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1119,120 S.Ct. 942 (2000). As explained
2

in the State's opening brief, the information in Officer McNaughton's affidavit was more
than sufficient to establish the informants' reliability and to otherwise support the
magistrate's probable cause determination that evidence of the crime would be found in the
storage shed. See Aplt. Brf. at 17-19.
B. The Search Warrant Was Not Overbroad.
In his fourth point, defendant argues that the provision in the warrant permitting the
search for "all items determined to be collateral or proceeds from narcotics transactions" was
so overbroad and lacking in particularity that it constituted an invalid general warrant and
that, correspondingly, there was no probable cause to support issuance of such a broad
warrant. Aple. Brf. at 29-32. This claim is meritless.
To prevent general exploratory searches, the Fourth Amendment requires that
warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. Const amend IV; see Andreson v. Maryland, All U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct.
2737,2748 (1976). "[A] warrant's description of things to be seized is sufificiendy particular
if it allows the searcher to "reasonably ascertain and identify the things to be seized.'" United
States v. Finnigin, 113 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750,752 (10th Cir. 1982)); cf. State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970,972
(Utah App. 1989) (holding that <4the description is sufficient if the officer executing the
search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place to be searched").
The test, therefore, is a "practical" one. Finnigin, 113 F.3d at 1186-87.

3

Particularity. The affidavit here authorized the search for and seizure of twelve
categories of evidence, including the following:
11. U.S. currency believed to be in close proximity to the narcotics being
searched for, and any and all items determined to be collateral or proceeds
from narcotics transactions.
R. 161 (emphasis added).2 Defendant challenges the latter phrase of the provision, arguing
that it is open-ended and otherwise confers upon police virtually "unlimited discretion to
rummage about and seize whatsoever they wished," but he does not acknowledge the
provision's initial reference to U.S. currency. Aplt. Brf. at Aple. Brf. at 29-31. In doing so,
he distorts the authorization intended in the warrant.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed that "general descriptions of
property are appropriate if descriptions of specific types of that property have already been
furnished, and different types of that property would be relevant in determining the crime."
Greene, 250 F.3d at 478; see also United States v. Peagler, 847 F.2d 756, 757 (11th Cir.
1988) (observing that although 44while the Fourth Amendment prohibits general exploratory
searches, elaborate specificity in a warrant is unnecessary")-3 Here, the affidavit first
specifically referred to U.S- currency, followed by a more general description of payment
2

Although defendant reproduces a warrant purportedly issued by the magistrate
here, see Addendum to Aple. Brf., the search warrant was not made part of the record.
Accordingly, this Court should not consider it on appeal. The State nevertheless assumes
that the warrant's description of the property to be seized coincided with the affidavit's
description.
3

This Court has also observed that "generic descriptions of property, although not
favored, have been held permissible in cases involving contraband." State v. Stromberg,
783 P.2d 54, 58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
4

forms. Fairly read, therefore, the authorization in the warrant was not "open-ended," but
limited to U.S. currency and other forms of remuneration.
Even in isolation, the phrase cannot be fairly interpreted to reach as far as defendant
claims. The challenged phrase cannot be reasonably read to permit the seizure of furniture,
books, photographs, magazines, appliances, or other items that one might typically find in
a storage shed. Nor can it fairly be read to permit the seizure of personal diaries or financial
records that bear no relation to defendant's drug operation. To the contrary, the challenged
phrase was at least limited to evidence likely associated with the drug trade and thus did not
give police "unlimited discretion to rummage about and seize whatsoever they wished." See
Aple. Brf. at 31.
Scope of Probable Cause. Defendant also argues that the warrant was overbroad
because nothing in the affidavit indicated "that anyone had seen proceeds from narcotics
sales in the premises to be searched, or any intimation that such things would be found."
Aple. Brf. at 31. This claim too is meritless.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the affidavit included sufficient information to support
a search for these items. In support of the provision authorizing the seizure of "all items
determined to be collateral or proceedsfromnarcotics transactions," Officer McNaughton
stated:
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for
methamphetamine and U.S. currency because your affiant's training and
experience has shown it is very common for suspects of narcotics offenses to
keep related evidence in their premises. Your affiant knowsfromtraining and
experience that distributors of narcotics do so for financial gain and that
5

quantities of U.S. Currency are found where narcotics search warrants are
served. For reasons included in this affidavit your affiant believes the storage
unit is being used as a drug distribution and manufacturing center.
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for packaging
material, paraphernalia, clandestine laboratory equipment and records of
controlled substances. . . . Your affiant knows from the past execution of
numerous controlled substance search warrants that suspects often keep
records to show dates, times, amounts purchased, who purchased, financial
gain and drug indebtedness. Your affiant also believes the premises should be
searched for lease records and ownership records of the named premises. Also
these items are consistently found during the execution of narcotics search
warrants.
R. 164.
Although no one observed any monies at the storage shed, "[a] magistrate is entitled
to rely on the expert opinions of officers when supporting factual information is supplied in
the affidavit." See United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289,292-93 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. State
v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, f 23, — Utah Adv. Rep — (observing that an officer's
experience may be considered in determining probable cause). In his affidavit, Officer
McNaughton indicated that he had received extensive training in drug-related investigation*
and had served as a member of the DEA Metro Narcotics Task Force for the past three years.
R. 162. The magistrate's reliance on Officer McNaughton's testimony was therefore
warranted.
C. The Magistrate Did Not Abandon His Role as a Neutral and Detached Judicial
Officer.
In his fourth and fifth points, defendant argues that the magistrate abandoned his role
as a neutral and detached judicial officer. See Aple. Brf. at 30-33. He argues that issuance
of the "broad" search warrant was akin to the conduct condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
6

York 442 U.S. 319,99 S.Ct. 2319 (1979). See Aple. Brf. at 30-31. Defendant misreads LoJi Sales.
In Lo-Ji Sales, a state investigator purchased two reels of film from an adult bookstore
and presented them to the town justice in support of a search warrant. 442 U.S. at 321,99
S.Ct. at 2321-22. The warrant application also requested that the town justice accompany
police during the search to determine what other materials were in violation of New York's
obscenity law. Id. After viewing the two films and the investigator's supporting affidavit,
the town justice signed the warrant Id. at 321, 99 S.Ct at 2322. The warrant not only
authorized the seizure of copies of the two films purchased by the investigator, but also the
seizure of unspecified material '"that the Court independently [on examination] has
determined to be possessed in violation of [the New York obscenity law]

'" Id. at 321-

22,99 S.Ct at 2322 (quoting the warrant) (first brackets in original). During the six-hourlong search, the town justice authorized the seizure of nearly 400 magazines and more than
400 films. Id. at 322-23, 99 S.Ct. at 2322-23. The defendant's subsequent motion to
suppress was denied and the state intermediate appellate court affirmed. Id. at 325,99 S.Ct.
at 2323.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 329,99 S.Ct. at 2326. The Court
held that "[t]he Town Justice did not manifest [the] neutrality and detachment demanded of
a judicial officer" in issuing a warrant, but instead "allowed himself to become a member,
if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation." Id. at 326-27,
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99 S.Ct. at 2324. In other words, the magistrate "was not acting as a judicial officer but as
an adjunct law enforcement officer." Id. at 327, 99 S.Ct. at 2324-25.
In this case, the magistrate did not participate in any manner in the execution of the
search warrant. He did not accompany police on the search. He did not add to the warrant
and he did not otherwise become involved in the investigation. He simply reviewed the
affidavit and made a determination that the facts therein supported the seizure of those things
particularly described in the warrant, including items that were "collateral or proceeds from
narcotics transactions." Contrary to defendant's claim, therefore, the magistrate's conduct
is nothing like that condemned Lo-Ji Sales and did not otherwise compromise his neutrality
and detachment as a judicial officer. Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 63 F.3d 937 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that magistrate's common sense additions to the search warrant affidavit did
not violate his duty ofneutrality and detachment); United States v. Con/ey,856F.Supp. 1010,
1025-26 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that the district justice did not abandon her neutral role
as a magistrate by cooperating with the police in processing 55 warrants), ajfd, 92 F.3d 157
(3rd Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 520 U.S. 1115,117 S.Ct 1244 (1997); Connally v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 245,250,97 S.Ct. 546,548-49 (1977) {per curiam) (holding that Georgia's justices
of the peace cannot be neutral and detached where they are paid based on the number of
warrants they issue, not review).
Defendant also contends that the magistrate compromised his duty ofneutrality and
detachment because he authorized a nighttime entry even though police had secured the
premises. Aple. Brf. at 32-33. However, the premises were not secured until after 4:00 in
8

the afternoon, see R. 195:4-7, and the warrant was not obtained until approximately 8:30 that
evening, see R. 78. Under these circumstances, the police cannot reasonably be required to
keep the premises secured until the following morning. Accordingly, the magistrate cannot
be said to have abandoned his role as a detached and neutral judicial officer in permitting the
immediate search of the premises.
• * *

In summary, the search warrant was supported by probable cause and was properly
limited to the search for and seizure of evidence relating to the manufacture and distribution
of drugs. In executing the warrant, the magistrate did not compromise his duty of neutrality
and detachment.4
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the State's opening brief, the State respectfully
requests that the Court reverse the trial court's order suppressing the evidence and remand
the case for trial.

4

Because the warrant was supported by probable cause and properly issued, the
State need not address defendant's good faith exception argument. See Aple. Brf. at 33.
Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that the search warrant affidavit did not
provide a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, it is not "so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
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